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ABSTRACT/RESUMÉ 
 
This paper describes trends in product market regulation in OECD countries over the period 1998 to 2003. 
The analysis is based on summary indicators of product market regulation that measure the degree to 
which policies promote or inhibit competition. The results suggest that regulatory impediments to 
competition have declined in all OECD countries in recent years. Regulation has also become more 
homogenous across the OECD as countries with relatively restrictive policies have, in some areas, moved 
towards the regulatory environment of the more liberalized countries. Within some countries product 
market policies have become more consistent across different regulatory provisions, although relatively 
restrictive countries still tend to have a more heterogeneous approach to competition. In general, domestic 
barriers to competition tend to be higher in countries that have higher barriers to foreign trade and 
investment, and high levels of state control and barriers to competition tend to be associated with 
cumbersome administrative procedures and policies that reduce the adaptability of labour markets. 
Notwithstanding recent progress in product market reform, a ‘hard core’ of regulations that impede 
competition still persists in virtually all countries. 
JEL Classification: K2, L5 
Key words: Indicators: Product market regulation 
 
***** 
Ce document décrit les évolutions de la réglementation encadrant les marchés de produits dans les pays de 
l'OCDE sur la période 1998-2003. L'analyse est basée sur des indicateurs synthétiques de la réglementation 
des marchés de produits qui mesurent l’intensité avec laquelle les politiques favorisent ou restreignent la 
concurrence. Les résultats suggèrent que les entraves à la concurrence résultant de la réglementation ont 
décliné dans tous pays de l’OCDE ces dernières années. La réglementation est aussi devenue plus 
homogène à travers l'OCDE, les pays disposant de politiques relativement restrictives, s’étant ralliés, dans 
certains domaines, à l’environnement réglementaire des pays plus libéraux. Dans certains pays, les 
politiques concernant les marchés de produits sont devenues plus cohérentes au regard des différents 
dispositifs réglementaires, même si les pays relativement restrictifs ont toujours tendance à disposer d’une 
approche plus disparate de la concurrence. De façon générale, les barrières à la concurrence résultant de 
politiques à vocation intérieure ont tendance à être plus importantes dans les pays disposant d’importants 
obstacles aux échanges internationaux et à l’investissement ; de même de hauts niveaux de contrôles 
étatiques et d’importants obstacles à la concurrence ont tendance à être associés avec d’encombrantes 
procédures administratives et des politiques qui réduisent la capacité d'adaptation du marché du travail. En 
dépit des récents progrès accomplis par les réformes des marchés de produits, un ‘noyau dur’ de 
règlements, entravant la concurrence, persiste toujours dans pratiquement tous les pays. 
Classification JEL : K2, L5 
Mots Clés : Indicateurs : Réglementation des marchés de produits 
 
Copyright OECD, 2005 
 
Applications for permission to reproduce or translate all, or part of, this material should be made to: 
Head of Publications Service, OECD, 2 rue André-Pascal, 75775 Paris Cedex 16, France. 
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PRODUCT MARKET REGULATION IN OECD COUNTRIES: 1998 TO 2003 
Paul Conway, Véronique Janod, Giuseppe Nicoletti1 
 
1. Introduction 
1. This paper describes changes in product market regulation in OECD countries from 1998 to the 
end of 2003. The analysis is based on the OECD indicators of Product Market Regulation (PMR), which 
were developed in 1998 to illustrate broad differences in product market policies in OECD countries 
(Nicoletti et al., 1999). The indicators are constructed from the perspective of regulations that have the 
potential to reduce the intensity of competition in areas of the product market where technology and 
market conditions make competition viable. They summarise a large set of formal rules and regulations 
that have a bearing on competition in OECD countries. As was the case in 1998, answers to a questionnaire 
sent to OECD Member governments (and collected in the OECD International Regulation Database) were 
the principal source of regulatory data used by the indicators. 2  
2.  The main characteristics of the OECD PMR indicators, which differentiate them from other 
indicators available from private research institutes and international organisations,3 are as follows: The 
PMR indicators are policy focused and ‘objective’ in that they are not based on opinion surveys and do not 
incorporate information about market outcomes; they follow a bottom-up approach, in which country 
scores can be related to specific underlying policies; they cover product market regulations that affect the 
economy at large, rather than focusing only on particular areas or sectors; and they are vetted by the 
national administrations of OECD member countries.  
3. In the 1998 work the PMR indicators were presented as point estimates for each country covered 
by the survey, conditional on the system of weights used to aggregate indicators of specific regulatory 
provisions into summary indicator values for broader regulatory domains and for the whole economy. This 
paper takes a step further and uses a ‘random weights’ technique to test the sensitivity of summary 
indicator values to different weighting schemes used in the aggregation. This yields confidence intervals 
around the point estimates which allow the robustness of cross-country and inter-temporal comparisons to 
be tested. In addition, relative to the 1998 version of the PMR indicators, this paper incorporates some 
improvements and extensions to the system. Notably, the design of some of the indicators has been slightly 
modified and the coverage of the underlying regulatory data improved, allowing the number of countries 
                                                     
1 OECD Economics Department, 2 rue André Pascal, 75775 Paris Cedex 16, France. Corresponding author 
is Paul Conway (Email: paul.conway@oecd.org). The authors would like to thank Jean-Philippe Cotis, 
Jorgen Elmeskov, and Mike Feiner for useful comments on an earlier draft of this paper. Thanks also go to 
Irene Sinha for secretarial support and Annick Bouchouchi-Lotrous for statistical assistance. The authors 
would also like to acknowledge the contribution of respondents to the OECD Regulatory Questionnaire in 
the national administrations of member countries.  
2 The values of all of the PMR indicators in 1998 and 2003, the OECD International Regulation Database, 
and the questionnaire, called the OECD Regulatory Indicators Questionnaire, are available via the OECD 
website at www.oecd.org/eco/pmr. 
3 For example, the indicators of the World Competitiveness Forum, the indicators of the Economic Freedom 
of the World, and the governance and “doing business” indicators of the World Bank.  
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included in the analysis to be extended. While these modifications make the indicators more reliable, they 
do not change the broad cross-country patterns previously described for 1998. 
4. The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 outlines the data and methodology used to construct 
the PMR indicators. Section 3 discusses changes in regulatory practice since 1998 based on the updated 
indicators, and tests the sensitivity of the findings to the system of weights used in aggregation. Section 4 
discusses the consistency of regulatory approaches across different aspects of product market regulation 
and with respect to selected labour market policies. Section 5 concludes and discusses possible future 
developments of the indicator system.  
 
Box 1. The effect of product market competition on economic performance 
Regulation is perhaps the most pervasive form of state intervention in economic activity. It is also essential for the 
good working of market economies. Over recent decades, however, policymakers have become increasingly 
concerned about the potential for regulation to be too intrusive and stifle market mechanisms, possibly affecting 
resource allocation and productive efficiency. In light of this, most OECD governments have been reviewing and 
updating their regulatory environment.  
 The process of reform has been closely intertwined with enhancing competition in product markets. 
Regulations that increase the role of competitive forces have been found to have important beneficial effects on GDP 
per capita -- a common measure of welfare -- through a number of channels. For instance, recent empirical research 
indicates that regulatory environments that favour competition have a positive impact on economy-wide productivity 
even when other potentially important factors -- such as human capital and country- and industry-specific effects -- are 
accounted for (Nicoletti and Scarpetta, 2003). An increase in the intensity of competition can enhance productivity by 
improving the allocation of resources and encouraging a stronger effort on the part of managers to improve efficiency. 
Increased innovation and technological diffusion have also been shown to be important factors in explaining this link 
between competition and productive performance (Aghion et al., 2001; Gust and Marquez, 2002). 
Enhanced product market competition can also contribute to growth in GDP per capita by increasing employment 
(Blanchard and Giavazzi, 2003). Recent research suggests that easier regulation of entry into product markets can 
have significant positive effects on employment (Haefke and Ebell, 2004; Nicoletti and Scarpetta, 2004). As restrictions 
are eased and competition increases, firms earn lower product market rents, activity is expanded and employment 
rates tend to rise. However, employment in some large firms, particularly in the network sectors, where previous 
regulations were conducive to over manning, may be adversely affected by deregulation. 
Finally, although the effects of product market reform on capital formation are, in theory, ambiguous, empirical 
studies have found that regulatory reforms, especially those that liberalise entry, are likely to spur fixed investment in 
some industries (Alesina et al., 2003). 
2. Measuring product market regulation 
5. The ability to benchmark current regulation and alternative policy options against the regulatory 
approaches of other countries is an important element of the OECD ‘peer review’ system and has proven 
useful in encouraging countries to implement structural reforms that enhance economic performance.4 
Quantitative measures of product market regulation are also useful in empirical analyses aimed at 
exploring the links between regulation, competition, and the determinants of growth (Box 1). These were 
the rationales for the initial development of the PMR indicators system in the late 1990s and the current 
update. This section outlines the data and methodology used to construct the PMR indicators.  
                                                     
4 For example, see the series of OECD Reviews of Regulatory Reform.  
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2.1 The OECD International Regulation Database 
6. The OECD International Regulation Database contains all the regulatory information used to 
construct the PMR indicators. As in 1998, answers to a detailed questionnaire on regulatory practices in 
OECD countries are the principal source of these data. The 2003 version of the questionnaire contains six 
sections spanning important aspects of general and sectoral regulatory policies as well as some aspects of 
industry structure (Table 1). Each section was answered by civil servants in national administrations that 
have knowledge and/or responsibilities related to the relevant policy areas. Within each country the 
respondents were usually coordinated by a single contact person. In total, the 2003 questionnaire collected 
805 data points for each OECD country. It was distributed in October 2003 and responses from most 
countries were received by mid-February 2004. Therefore, most of the data reflect regulations in place at 
the end of 2003. 
Table 1: Number of basic data points in the OECD regulatory indicators questionnaire 2003 
Section 
Number of 
data points Short description  
Section 1: General Policies 223 
1.1 Firm ownership, control and legal status 129 
1.2 Antitrust exclusions and exemptions 6 
1.3 Market access, market dominance and vertical 
separation of network sectors 88 
Section 1 focuses on public ownership, 
market access and competition issues, 
market structure and vertical relationships 
in utilities and other network industries 
Section 2: Regulatory and administrative policies 44 
2.1 Regulation 32 
2.2 The treatment of foreign parties 12 
Section 2 focuses on regulatory 
processes and capacities in the public 
administration. 
Section 3:  Administrative requirements for business 
start-ups 129 
Section 3 focuses on the administrative 
requirements that entrepreneurs must 
satisfy in order to start a new business. 
Section 4: Regulation of professional services 227 
4.1 Exclusive and shared exclusive tasks 83 
4.2 Entry Requirements 36 
4.3 Treatment of foreign professionals 32 
4.4 Regulations on Market Behaviour  76 
Section 4 focuses on regulations that 
may have an impact on the accounting, 
legal services, engineering, and 
architectural professions. 
Section 5: Regulation in transportation industries 131 
5.1 Road freight 25 
5.2 Railways 74 
5.3 Air Travel (non freight) 32 
Section 5 focuses on regulations affecting 
access, business conduct, and industry 
and market structure in three transport 
sectors: road freight, railways and 
passenger air travel. 
Section 6: Regulation in the retail distribution 
industry 51 
6.1 Regulatory environment 31 
6.2 Industry behaviour 13 
6.3 Prices 7 
Section 6 focuses on regulations affecting 
access and business conduct in the retail 
sector. 
Total 805   
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7. The quality of the data in the OECD regulation database is clearly an extremely important 
consideration. Accordingly, a great deal of effort was put into ensuring that responses to the questionnaire 
were consistent across countries and in comparison to the 1998 data. In particular, national administrations 
were asked to provide further information on the answers to specific questions in the following 
circumstances: 
• If the answer to a question changed between 1998 and 2003 or was inconsistent with other 
‘dynamic’ data (from the questionnaire or other sources) on the direction of policy change in the 
relevant area. In theses cases respondents were asked to provide additional information to 
substantiate the 2003 response and the direction of recent policy changes.  
• If a country’s answer to a question appeared to be inconsistent with other countries. In these 
cases respondents were sent additional guidance on how to interpret the question and asked to 
review or confirm their answer.  
• If answers to questions were not given. Respondents were asked to provide missing information, 
especially if it is used directly in the PMR indicators system. 
After this second iteration with countries, the regulation data were also vetted by OECD economists 
and other in-house experts. In some cases, the data issues identified at this stage warranted an additional 
iteration with respondents in national administrations.  
8. At the end of the data collection process, the average response rate to the questionnaire across all 
countries stood at around 92%. The average response rate for the subset of questions used directly in the 
PMR indicators was also around this level. In some cases gaps in the data could be filled with data from 
1998, bringing the average availability of questionnaire data used directly in the indicators to almost 97%. 
For a number of countries, 100% of the data necessary to construct the indicators were available in 2003. 
In addition, the quality and consistency of the data were also significantly improved relative to the first-
round responses. 
9. In total, the PMR indicators summarise information on 139 economy-wide or industry-specific 
regulatory provisions. Of these, 129 data points are extracted or computed from answers to the 
questionnaire. The remaining 10 data points are taken from OECD publications or other sources. In 
particular, the primary external data sources are: 
• Data on the telecommunications sector come from the OECD Communications Outlook (2003). 
• Data on average tariff rates are drawn from the Integrated Data Base (IDB) of the World Trade 
Organization. 
• Data on the proceeds from the sale of state-owned enterprises are provided by Privatisation 
Barometer, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (www.privatizationbarometer.net).  
• Data on the number of busiest air transport routes subject to price regulation are drawn from the 
Digest of Bilateral Air Transport Agreements database of the International Civil Aviation 
Organization. 
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• For member countries of the European Union, data on the administrative burdens on business 
start-ups and professional services had already been collected in recent reports.5 Accordingly, 
these countries were given the option of not answering these sections of the questionnaire if they 
considered the data in these reports to be accurate and up-to-date. Some European Union 
countries did take this opportunity to update or revise the data contained in the previous reports.6 
Questionnaire replies were therefore used for these European Union countries as well as for non-
European Union countries. 
10. The subset of data included in the PMR system was chosen to match the earlier vintage of 1998 
indicators, fitting the broad policy areas covered by them (see below). It was also aimed at reflecting both 
all-purpose and industry-specific regulations that would be representative of the economy-wide regulatory 
approaches. Finally, it was delimited by the wish to ensure a complete coverage of OECD countries.7 
2.2 The PMR indicator system 
11. The structure of the indicator system is shown in Figure 1. The system is in the form of a pyramid 
with 16 low-level indicators at the base and one overall indicator of product market regulation at the top. 
Each of the low-level indicators captures a specific aspect of the regulatory regime. In total, the low-level 
indicators span most of the important aspects of general regulatory practice as well as some aspects of 
industry-specific regulatory policies (in particular, in retail distribution, air and rail passenger transport, rail 
and road freight, telecommunications) (see Box 2).  
12. To calculate the indicators, the qualitative information contained in the OECD International 
Regulation Database  – such as YES/NO answers – is coded by assigning a numerical value to each of the 
possible responses to a given question. Quantitative information is subdivided into classes using a system 
of thresholds. The coded information is normalised over a scale of zero to six, reflecting increasing 
restrictiveness of regulatory provisions for competition. These data are then aggregated into low-level 
indicators by assigning subjective weights to the various regulatory provisions. Given the normalisation of 
the basic data all the low-level indicators also have a scale of zero to six. Details of how each of the low-
level indicators is calculated, including the weights used in its construction and the techniques used to 
handle missing data, are given in the annex.  
13. At each step up the pyramid the regulatory domain summarised by the indicators becomes 
broader. Higher-level indicators are calculated as weighted averages of their constituent lower-level 
indicators. The attribution of lower-level indicators to each higher-level indicator, and the weights used in 
the averaging, are based on principal component analysis. For a given regulatory domain this technique 
reveals sets of lower-level indicators that are most associated with different underlying (unobserved) 
principal components. In most cases, these principal components represent sub-domains of regulation that 
can be given a straightforward economic interpretation. Within each principal component, the lower-level 
indicators are weighted according to the proportion of the cross-country variance of the component that is 
                                                     
5 See CSES (2002) and Paterson et al (2003) respectively.  
6 For administrative burdens on start-ups the following European Union countries elected to submit new 
data: Austria, Belgium, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, and Portugal. For professional services the 
following European Union countries elected to submit new data: Austria, Belgium (accounting and 
architectural services only), Germany, Ireland, Italy, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom.  
7 The additional data collected by means of the questionnaire also constitute the basis for the OECD 
industry-level indicators of regulation and other OECD policy indicators. 
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explained by them. In this way, indicators that have the largest variation across countries are assigned the 
largest weights.8 Figure 1 provides a summary of the weights used in aggregation.  
14. At the top of the structure the overall indicator of product market regulation summarises the main 
features of the regulatory framework in the product market of each country. One important advantage of 
this system is that the value of higher-level indicators can be traced with an increasing degree of detail to 
the values of the more disaggregated indicators and, eventually, to specific data points in the regulation 
database. This allows differences in indicator values across time and countries to be decomposed into 
specific differences in regulation. This is not possible with indicator systems based on opinion surveys, 
which can identify perceived areas of policy weakness, but cannot attribute these to specific policy 
settings. 
Figure 1. The PMR indicator System1 
     
Economic regulation
Administrative regulation
1.The numbers in brackets indicate the weight given to each lower level indicator in the calculation of the higher level indicator immediately above it. 
The weights were derived by applying principal components analysis to the set of indicators in each of the main regulatory domains (state control, barriers to 
entrepreneurship, barriers to trade and investment, economic regulation and administrative regulation). The same approach was used to derive the weights used 
to calculate the indicators of inward and outward-oriented policies and the overall PMR indicator. The principal components analysis was based on 
the original 1998 data.
2. Two indicators from the 1998 version of the PMR indicators ('Special voting rights' and 'Control of public enterprise by legislative bodies') have been combined into this indicator.
Outward-oriented policies                 (0.41)
State control             (0.49)
Barriers to                 
entrepreneurship            
(0.51)
Barriers to trade and investment  
(1.0)
Public ownership 
(0.56)
Involvement in 
business operation   
(0.44)
Product market regulation
Inward-oriented policies              (0.59)
Barriers to          
competition         
(0.22)
Scope of public 
enterprise sector  
(0.30)
Price controls (0.45)
Licenses and permits 
system (0.55)
Administrative burdens for 
corporation       (0.36)
Explicit barriers to trade    
and investment          (0.70)
Regulatory and        
administrative opacity   
(0.48)
Administrative              
burdens                         on 
startups             (0.30)
Regulatory barriers  
(1.0)
Legal barriers (0.30) Discriminatory 
procedures         (0.24)
Other barriers      
(0.30)
Foreign ownership 
barriers            (0.45)
Size of public 
enterprise sector 
(0.30)
Use of command & 
control regulation     
(0.55)
Communication and 
simplification of rules 
and procedures      
(0.45)
Administrative burdens for 
sole proprietor firms (0.30)
Direct control over 
business 
enterprises2          
(0.40)
Antitrust exemptions 
(0.70)Sector specific administrative 
burdens (0.34) Tariffs                (0.31)
{regulation data} {regulation data} {regulation data}{regulation data} {regulation data} {regulation data} {regulation data}
 
 
                                                     
8 More information on factor analysis in the context of the PMR indicators can be found in Nicoletti et al. 
(1999). One downside of weights estimated using this technique is that they are sensitive to revisions in the basic 
data. As discussed below, the 1998 data on which the weights were originally based has been revised as part of the 
current update. However, the weights were not re-estimated, partly because the sensitivity analysis presented later 
suggests that the main conclusions of the paper are to a large extent robust to the choice of weights used in the 
construction of the indicators. 
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Box 2. The low-level PMR indicators 
There are 16 low-level indicators in the PMR system. These indicators cover a wide range of product market 
policies. This box gives a brief description of each low-level indicator. Comprehensive details on the data and 
methodology used to construct the low-level indicators are provided in the annex. 
 Scope of public enterprises: this indicator measures the pervasiveness of state ownership across business 
sectors as the proportion of sectors in which the state has an equity stake in at least one firm. 
 Size of public enterprise: reflects the overall size of state-owned enterprises relative to the size of the economy. 
 Direct control over business enterprises: measures the existence of government special voting rights in 
privately-owned firms, constraints on the sale of state-owned equity stakes, and the extent to which legislative 
bodies control the strategic choices of public enterprises.  
 Price controls: reflects the extent of price controls in specific sectors. 
 Use of command and control regulation: indicates the extent to which government uses coercive (as opposed 
to incentive-based) regulation in general and in specific service sectors. 
 Licenses and permits systems: reflects the use of ‘one-stop shops’ and ‘silence is consent’ rules for getting 
information on and issuing licenses and permits. 
 Communication and simplification of rules and procedures: reflects aspects of government’s communication 
strategy and efforts to reduce and simplify the administrative burden of interacting with government. 
 Administrative burdens for corporations: measures the administrative burdens on the creation of 
corporations. 
 Administrative burdens for sole proprietors: measures the administrative burdens on the creation of sole 
proprietor firms. 
 Sector-specific administrative burdens: reflects administrative burdens in the road transport and retail 
distribution sectors. 
 Legal barriers: measures the scope of explicit legal limitations on the number of competitors allowed in a wide 
range of business sectors. 
 Antitrust exemptions: measures the scope of exemptions to competition law for public enterprises. 
 Ownership barriers: reflects legal restrictions on foreign acquisition of equity in public and private firms and in 
the telecommunications and airlines sectors. 
 Tariffs: reflects the (simple) average of most-favoured-nation tariffs. 
 Discriminatory procedures: reflects the extent of discrimination against foreign firms at the procedural level. 
 Regulatory barriers: reflects other barriers to international trade (e.g. international harmonisation, mutual 
recognition agreements). 
 
15. The PMR indicators are based primarily on explicit policy settings and only account for formal 
government regulation. Thus, the indicators only record ‘objective’ data about rules and regulations, as 
opposed to ‘subjective’ assessments of market participants in indicators based on opinion surveys. This 
isolates the indicators from context-specific assessments and makes them comparable across countries, but 
also implies some limitations. ‘Informal’ regulatory practices, such as administrative guidance or self-
disciplinary measures of professional associations, are only captured to a very limited extent in the PMR 
indicators system. Similarly, the way in which regulations are applied by enforcement authorities, which 
ECO/WKP(2005)6 
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can have a considerable impact on competition in a given market, is also only reflected in a relatively 
minor way in the PMR indicators system. 9 
3. Progress in regulatory reform, 1998-2003 
16. This section uses the updated PMR indicators to illustrate progress made by OECD countries in 
regulatory reform. It begins with a brief review of the indicator values for OECD countries in 1998, which 
have been extended, reviewed, and revised in the context of the updating. It then outlines the broad trends 
in regulatory policy that have occurred between 1998 and 2003, before finishing with a review of 
regulatory patterns in OECD countries in 2003. 
3.1 1998 revisited 
17. The current update has provided the opportunity to extend and review the 1998 indicators, which 
were originally described in Nicoletti et al. (1999). A comparison of the 1998 and 2003 data identified 
some inaccuracies in the 1998 version of the OECD’s International Regulation Database, which, in 
consultation with national administrations, have been corrected so as to ensure consistency across time. 
Some of the gaps in the 1998 data set have also been filled, making it possible to calculate point-estimates 
of the indicators for a number of OECD countries that were not included in the original analysis.10 In 
addition, some small modifications have been made to the design of some of the low-level PMR indicators. 
However, the effect of these modifications, which are described in the annex, is very minor.  
18. Figure 2 graphs the original and revised PMR indicators for OECD countries in 1998, as well as 
the three constituent indicators of state control, barriers to entrepreneurship, and barriers to foreign trade 
and investment. For all countries included in the previous exercise, except Canada and Belgium, the 
revisions have led to an increase in the value of the overall 1998 indicators. This reflects that, on balance, 
the process of comparing the 1998 and 2003 data sets identified restrictive policies that were not captured 
in the original analysis. Most of these revisions involved the indicators of state control and barriers to trade 
and investment. 
19. The revisions to the 1998 indicators have not changed the broad observation of important 
differences in product market regulation across countries. The United Kingdom, Australia, the United 
States, Canada, New Zealand, Denmark, and Ireland are estimated to have had the least restrictive overall 
regulatory environment in 1998. Within this group, the United Kingdom was estimated to be relatively 
liberal in all three of the broad policy domains further down the PMR pyramid. Australia, the United 
States, Canada, and especially New Zealand, however, are estimated to have had a more restrictive 
approach to foreign trade and investment relative to the inward-oriented policies of state control and 
barriers to entrepreneurship. Conversely, Ireland and Denmark were estimated to be highly open to trade 
and investment in 1998, but were deemed more restrictive in terms of state control. 
                                                     
9 For a comparison of indicators based on subjective and objective data see Nicoletti and Pryor (2005). 
These authors point out, nonetheless, that country rankings based on both approaches are broadly 
consistent. 
10 These countries are: Iceland, Mexico, Korea, Hungary, the Czech Republic, Turkey, and Poland. 
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Figure 2. The Situation in 19981 
1. The scale of indicators is 0-6 from least to most restrictive.
1998 original refers to the 1998 PMR indicators originally presented in Nicoletti et al.  (1999).
1998 refers to the revised and updated 1998 PMR indicators. 
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20. At the other end of the spectrum, Poland, Turkey, the Czech Republic, Greece, and Italy are 
estimated to have had regulatory environments that were the least conducive to product market competition 
in the OECD in 1998. A relatively high degree of state control was a feature of product market regulation 
in all these countries and barriers to entrepreneurship were also high in Turkey, Poland, and Italy. Poland, 
the Czech Republic, and to a lesser extent, Turkey also stand out as having had particularly restrictive 
barriers to foreign trade and investment in comparison to the other OECD countries.  
21. To assess the statistical significance of the estimated differences in product market regulation, 
Figure 3 graphs 90% confidence intervals for the 1998 PMR indicators calculated using a ‘random 
weights’ technique (Box 3). Across a number of countries the PMR indicators were not statistically 
different when uncertainty about the weights used to construct them is taken into consideration. However, 
at this level of confidence, two broad country groupings with clearly distinct regulatory regimes can be 
identified in 1998: a ‘relatively liberal’ group of countries -- including the common-law countries and 
Denmark -- and a ‘relatively restrictive’ group of countries -- including Poland, Turkey, Czech Republic, 
Greece, Italy, France, Mexico, Korea, Hungary, and Spain. The rest of the OECD countries -- the ‘middle 
of the road’ group -- were not statistically distinguishable from these two groups at the 90% level of 
confidence. 
     'relatively restrictive' countries are significantly different at the 90 percent level of confidence.
Figure 3. 
 Confidence intervals for the PMR indicators, 19981
(at 90 per cent levels)
1. The confidence intervals are calculated using stochastic weights on the low-level indicators to generate a distribution of overall PMR indicators 
     for each country. The 90 percent confidence intervals are calculated from that distribution. Indicator values for the 'relatively liberal' and 
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Box 3. The random weights technique 
Starting with the 16 low-level indicators, this technique uses 10 000 sets of randomly-generated weights to 
calculate 10 000 overall indicators for each country.1 The random weights are drawn from a uniform distribution 
between zero and one and then normalised so as to sum to one. This is equivalent to assuming complete uncertainty 
about the most appropriate value of each of the individual weights used to construct the PMR indicators. Accordingly, 
the resulting distribution of indicators for each country reflects the possible range of values given no a priori information 
on the most appropriate value for each of the weights.2 Confidence intervals and the probability of a given country 
achieving a given rank are calculated from these distributions.  
The confidence intervals are centred on the mean value of each country’s 10 000 indicator values. Given that the 
weights are drawn from a uniform distribution between zero and one, the mean indicator values are asymptotically 
equivalent to indicators calculated using equal weights on each of the 16 low-level indicators. These differ from the 
PMR indicators, given that the weights in the PMR system are not equal. In all cases, however, the PMR indicator 
values fall within the confidence interval. 
_________________________ 
1. The sensitivity of the indicators to changes in the subjective weights used to construct the low-level indicators (see the annex) has 
not been tested. 
2. Note that this is not equivalent to having no a priori information on the most appropriate set of weights given that the sum of two or 
more uniform distributions is not uniform.  
 
3.2 A degree of policy convergence over the past five years 
22. On (unweighted) average across OECD countries, product market regulation has become more 
conducive to competition since 1998 (Figure 4a). Visible progress has been made in reducing barriers to 
competition in all three of the broad areas of regulation captured in the PMR indicators. Slightly more 
progress, however, has been made in reducing state control and barriers to trade and investment than in 
reducing barriers to entrepreneurship (Figure 4b). 
23. As is apparent from Figure 5, the reduction in state control in the OECD has, in large part, been 
due to the easing or elimination of coercive forms of regulation (command-and-control measures, price 
controls) and less state interference in the choices of public or private business enterprises (direct control 
over business enterprises). In contrast, on average, there has not been a great deal of privatisation 
undertaken (as reflected in the indicators of the scope and size of the public enterprise sector).11 Hence, by 
and large, reform in this policy domain is successfully moving away from ‘command-and-control’ to 
‘incentive-based’ regulations, but the extent of the state’s commercial interests has not decreased 
substantially since 1998. As well as being beneficial in its own right, the move away from command-and-
control regulation could also be an important prequel to further privatisations. A greater reliance on 
incentive-based regulation lessens the need for the state to be directly involved in product markets and 
increases the attractiveness of state-owned assets to the private sector. 
                                                     
11 This is in comparison to the early and mid-1990s when privatisation was more prevalent. See, for example, 
Megginson and Netter (2001).  
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1.  OECD-wide average is a simple average of the overall PMR indicators for 29 OECD countries.
     The scale of the indicator is 0-6 from least to most restrictive of competition.
Figure 4. Progress in regulatory reform, 1998 to 2003
Panel A. OECD-wide average of PMR indicator levels1
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Panel B.  Change in OECD-wide average PMR indicator
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0.0
Change 1998-2003
State control
Barriers to entrepreneurship
Barriers to trade and investment
 
 
24. In the policy domain of barriers to entrepreneurship, progress across the OECD has been 
particularly limited with respect to removing remaining legal barriers to new entry in product markets that 
are sheltered from competition, such as several non-manufacturing industries. The simplification of 
administrative procedures and reduction of burdens on business start-ups has also been limited, except for 
a marked improvement in licence and permit systems due to more widespread use of one-stop shops and, 
to a lesser extent, ‘silence is consent’ rules.  
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Figure 5.  Sources of change in the OECD-average PMR indicator, 1998 to 20031 
1.  Shows the contribution of each of the 16 low-level (OECD average) PMR indicators to the change of the OECD-average overall 
PMR indicator. 
-0.08
-0.07
-0.06
-0.05
-0.04
-0.03
-0.02
-0.01
0
Sc
op
e 
of 
pu
blic
 
en
ter
pri
se
 
se
cto
r 
Siz
e 
of 
pu
blic
 
en
ter
pri
se
 
se
cto
r 
Dir
ec
t c
on
tro
l o
ve
r b
us
ine
ss
 
en
ter
pri
se
s
Us
e 
of 
co
m
m
an
d &
 
co
ntr
ol 
re
gu
lat
ion
 
Pri
ce
 
co
ntr
ols
Lic
en
ce
s 
an
d p
erm
its 
sys
tem
Co
m
m
un
ica
tion
 
an
d s
imp
lific
ati
on
 o
f ru
les
 
an
d p
roc
ed
ur
es
Ad
m
inis
tra
tive
 
bu
rde
ns
 
for
 
co
rpo
ra
tio
ns
Ad
m
inis
tra
tive
 
bu
rde
ns
 fo
r s
ole
 pr
op
rie
tor
 fir
m
s 
Se
cto
r-s
pe
cifi
c a
dm
inis
tra
tive
 
bu
rde
ns
 
Le
ga
l ba
rrie
rs
 
An
titr
us
t e
xe
m
pti
on
s 
Ow
ne
rs
hip
 ba
rrie
rs
 
Dis
cr
im
ina
tor
y p
roc
ed
ur
es
 
Re
gu
lat
or
y b
ar
rie
rs
 
Ta
riff
s 
State 
Control
Barriers to 
trade and 
investment
Barriers to entrepreneurship
 
25. In contrast, significant easing was recorded in all types of barriers to foreign trade and 
investment, further increasing the outward orientation and the trade integration of OECD economies. 
Average most-favoured-nation tariff rates have declined in most countries and restrictions on foreign direct 
investment have also softened somewhat over the past five years.12 In most countries, ceilings on foreign 
ownership and limitations on management and business choices are the main remaining impediments 
(Golub, 2003). 
26. As a result of regulatory reform since 1998, there is now less variation in overall product market 
policies across OECD countries (Figure 6). To a significant extent, this reduction in cross-country 
dispersion is due to convergence towards the regulatory practices of the most liberal OECD economies. In 
other words, countries that had relatively restrictive product market policies in 1998 have generally made 
more progress than countries with policies that were already more conducive to product market 
                                                     
12 The most-favoured-nation (MFN) tariff rates used in the PMR system are ad valorem and do not account 
for specific tariffs. The latter are frequently used on agricultural and food products with effects that are 
both less transparent and often more restrictive than ad valorem duties. MFN tariff rates also do not capture 
preferential tariffs, the trade importance of which has been growing over recent years with the expansion of 
regional trade agreements. The recent evolution of MFN tariff protection reflects reductions agreed in the 
Uruguay Round, with some differentiation according to sector, which a simple average may not accurately 
reflect. The tarification of non-tariff barriers in the agricultural sector is also an important determinant of 
recent changes in MFN tariffs.  
ECO/WKP(2005)6 
 16 
competition, implying a positive relationship between the initial level of regulation and the extent of 
reform over the past five years (Figure 7a). 
Figure 6. Smaller cross-country variance in regulatory approaches1 
1. Box plots of the overall PMR indicator and its three components. The horizontal line in the middle of the box is
     the median value of the indicator across OECD or EU 15 countries. The edges of the box are the 2nd and 3rd
     quartiles of the cross-country distribution. The two whiskers are the extreme values and the dots represent outliers. 
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27. Convergence in the overall PMR indicator is due in large part to convergence in policies 
governing the extent of state involvement in product markets. Countries that had a relatively high degree of 
state control in 1998 have since made visible progress in this area (Figure 7b). The dispersion of barriers to 
entrepreneurship has also fallen since 1998 (Figure 6) and there is evidence of convergence (Figure 7c). In 
2003, barriers to trade and investment are the most homogenous of the three broad policy domains 
(Figure 6). This reflects the fact that many of these regulations are determined by multilateral agreements 
and/or supranational institutions that often impose high standards of openness to trade and investment on 
their constituent countries. These institutions also tend to spread reform in this area across countries 
irrespective of their starting level; hence, the evidence of convergence in this sub-indicator is less 
compelling (Figure 7d).  
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Figure 7. Examining convergence in regulatory approaches 1,2 
Panel A. PMR Panel B. State Control
Panel C: Barriers to entrepreneurship Panel D. Barriers to trade and investment
1. The scale of the indicators is 0-6 from least to most restrictive of competition.
2.  A negative correlation between the indicator value in 1998 and its change between 1998 and 2003 is indicative of convergence in 
regulation given that the scale of the indicators is 0 to 6 from least to most restrictive
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Figure 8. Regulation in 1998 and 20031 
1. Sorted by 2003 values. The scale of indicators is 0-6 from least to most restrictive of competition.
*  EU 15 (simple average)
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28. For the group of EU member countries in 2003 product market regulation is typically more 
homogenous than in the rest of the OECD (Figure 6). In addition, convergence towards lower barriers to 
product market competition has been stronger than in other OECD member countries, given stronger 
convergence in state control and, to a lesser extent, barriers to entrepreneurship.13 This relatively strong 
rate of convergence may reflect efforts to implement the single market programme. If confirmed, this result 
would constitute a reversal of previous findings based on the analysis of regulatory reforms in non-
manufacturing industries that suggested relatively weaker convergence within EU countries over the 1975 
to 1998 period (Nicoletti and Scarpetta, 2003). 
3.3 Product market regulation to 2003 
29. The overall PMR indicators and three constituent indicators for each country in 1998 and 2003 
are shown in Figure 8. According to the PMR indicators, the regulatory environment has become more 
conducive to product market competition in all countries for which 1998 data are available. Given the 
volume of regulatory information contained in the system, only the most apparent policy developments are 
discussed here on a country-by-country basis. For expositional purposes, countries are split into three 
groups, as identified above, depending on their estimated degree of product market regulation in 1998. 
The ‘relatively restrictive’ countries  
30. Consistent with the pattern of convergence identified earlier, countries that were estimated to 
have had relatively restrictive product market regulations in 1998 -- Poland, Turkey, Czech Republic, 
Greece, Italy, France, Mexico, Korea, Hungary, and Spain -- have, in most cases, also recorded a relatively 
large improvement in overall product market regulation. For most of these countries the reform of product 
market regulations since 1998 has led to substantial improvements in all three of the broad policy domains 
captured by the sub-indicators. In particular: 
• State control, which was generally relatively pervasive in 1998, has been reduced substantially. 
In all cases this reflects the removal of price controls -- especially in the air transport and 
telecommunications sectors -- and, except for France and Spain, reductions in the extent of direct 
government control over firms. For example, legal restrictions on the sale of state-owned equity 
have been removed in the Czech Republic, Poland, and Italy; ‘golden shares’ have been 
redeemed in Korea and Greece; and the legislature no longer controls directly the strategic 
choices of public firms in the Czech Republic and Greece. 
• Progress in reducing barriers to entrepreneurship has been more disparate in this group of 
countries. Italy, France, Korea, Turkey, and Spain, which were estimated as having some of the 
most restrictive barriers to entrepreneurship in 1998, have since made substantial progress. In 
Italy, France, and Spain this was driven predominantly by substantial reductions in the 
administrative burdens on start-up firms. Italy and Turkey also removed legal barriers to entry in 
some sectors, while Korea improved some aspects of public governance. Poland has made 
progress in this policy domain by reducing legal barriers to entry in some sectors while Greece 
and Mexico have improved the system of licences and permits. In the Czech Republic and 
Hungary progress in this policy domain has been more limited. 
                                                     
13 The correlation coefficient between the 1998 levels of the overall PMR indicator and changes over the 
1998-2003 period is -0.95 (t=10.54) in the EU 15 and -0.78 (t=4.16) in non-EU 15 countries. For the 
indicator of state control the  correlation coefficients for the EU 15 and non-EU 15 countries are -0.81 (t=-
5.03) and -0.66 (t=2.92) respectively. For barriers to entrepreneurship the corresponding figures are -0.78 
(t=-4.56) and -0.70 (t=-3.24). 
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• In the policy domain of barriers to international trade and investment all the countries in this 
group have become more open as a result of higher ceilings on foreign investment in the airline 
and telecommunication sectors and, except for Mexico, lower average tariffs. In the Czech 
Republic and Poland a range of other measures -- such as explicit recognition of the national 
treatment principle, the use of Mutual Recognition Agreements, and access for foreigners to 
regulatory appeal procedures -- have also contributed to large improvements in this area. This 
may reflect reforms implemented in the run up to accession to the European Union. 
31. For all countries in this group, except Mexico and Hungary, the improvement in the PMR 
indicator between 1998 and 2003 is statistically significant at the 90% level of confidence (Figure 9a).14 At 
the level of the sub-indicators the improvement in state control is significant in Korea, the Czech Republic, 
Greece, and Italy (Figure 9b). The improvement in barriers to trade and investment in the Czech Republic, 
Poland, and Spain is also significant (Figure 9c), as is the improvement in barriers to entrepreneurship in 
France (Figure 9d). 
32. Although regulatory progress in these countries has, in most cases, been substantial, reforms have 
not always been sufficiently deep to close the gap relative to other OECD countries, which have also 
implemented reforms over the same period. To varying degrees, countries in this group are still estimated 
to have some of the most restrictive product market regulations in the OECD. A continuing high level of 
state control is generally the most significant difference between these countries and the rest of the OECD. 
In particular, the scope and size of the public enterprise sector is still estimated to be relatively large and 
policy objectives tend to be achieved by coercive forms of regulation. 
The ‘relatively liberal’ countries 
33. In line with the convergence theme, countries that were estimated to be relatively liberal in 1998 
-- the United Kingdom, the United States, Australia, New Zealand, Canada, Ireland, and Denmark -- have 
also tended to record relatively small improvement in product market regulation. With a few exceptions, 
the pattern of product market reform in these countries has tended to consist of small incremental 
improvements across the range of PMR indicators. Most notably: 
• In the policy domain of state control, Australia and Denmark have made progress by lessening 
recourse to ‘command-and-control’ regulation. In Australia, regulations on retail trade have been 
decentralised and universal service requirements for airlines removed, while in Denmark policy 
alternatives to coercive regulations are being given greater consideration. Ireland has also 
improved in this policy domain due to marginal reforms in most of the areas covered by the low-
level indicators. 
• All countries in this group have recorded some improvement in barriers to entrepreneurship, 
predominantly as a result of small reductions in administrative burdens on business start-ups and 
minor improvements in the communication and simplification of rules and procedures. 
• Barriers to trade and investment have also fallen by minor amounts in all these countries. New 
Zealand recorded a more significant reduction in this policy domain due to lessening policy 
discrimination against foreign firms. 
 
                                                     
14 That is, the confidence intervals around the 1998 and 2003 PMR indicators do not overlap implying that 
the improvement between 1998 and 2003 is robust to the choice of weights used to calculate the indicator.  
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34. For all of these countries, the improvement in product market reform is not significant at the 90% 
level of confidence. This is also the case for the sub-indicators, although the improvement in state control 
in Australia is almost significant at this level (Figure 9). However, these countries are still estimated to 
have some of the most liberal product market regimes in the OECD. This generally reflects lower barriers 
to entrepreneurship and less state control relative to other OECD countries. In contrast, many of these 
countries do not score well in the (relatively homogenous) sub-indicator of barriers to trade and 
investment, primarily because of relatively restrictive barriers to foreign ownership.  
35. The fact that these countries are estimated to have relatively liberal product market policies does 
not mean that the scope for increasing competition through regulatory reform has been exhausted. As well 
as lowering barriers to foreign ownership, these countries could also enhance the role of market forces in 
other areas. For example, the proportion of sectors in which legal barriers restrict entry or the state owns 
equity in at least one firm can still be relatively high in some of these countries. Furthermore, in a few 
cases, aspects of product market regulation have become somewhat less conducive to competition since 
1998. For example, in New Zealand the scope of the public enterprise sector has increased, while in the 
United Kingdom restrictions on the sale of state owned equity in the post office have recently been 
enacted. 
The ‘middle of the road’ countries  
36. Countries estimated to be in the middle of the distribution of PMR indicators in 1998 are Iceland, 
the Netherlands, Sweden, Norway, Germany, Austria, Japan, Belgium, Finland, Switzerland, and Portugal.  
• All of these countries have made progress in reducing the extent of state control. This has 
typically been achieved by removing price controls and relying less on ‘command-and-control’ 
regulation to achieve policy objectives. The extent of direct government control over business has 
also been reduced in some of these countries, but not to the same extent as in the group of 
countries that were estimated to be ‘relatively restrictive’ in 1998. 
• Reductions in barriers to entrepreneurship have been more disparate across these countries. 
Sweden, Finland, and Japan have all made substantial progress by improving the system of 
licences and permits and government communication. Norway, Germany and Portugal have also 
made solid progress in this policy domain as a result of lower administrative burdens. The other 
countries in this group have virtually maintained the status quo in this policy domain since 1998.  
• Reductions in barriers to trade and investment in this group of countries have been spread 
across the range of low-level indicators. 
37. In Finland, Japan, and Portugal the improvement in product market regulation is significant at the 
90% level of confidence (Figure 9). For the sub-indicators, barriers to entrepreneurship have improved 
significantly in Finland whereas the improvement in state control is significant in Portugal and almost 
significant in Finland. Notwithstanding this progress, state control is still relatively pervasive in these two 
countries, while barriers to foreign trade and investment remain in Japan. In the other countries in this 
group, the improvement in product market reform is not significant at the 90% level of confidence, 
although it comes close to significance in Iceland and Sweden. In Iceland and Germany the improvement 
in state control is significant as is the improvement in barriers to trade and investment in Belgium.  
38. Despite progress in some regulatory areas, the relative positions of Norway, the Netherlands, and, 
to a lesser extent, Switzerland and Austria have slipped somewhat, predominantly as a result of restrictive 
barriers to entrepreneurship in the Netherlands, Austria, and Switzerland and persisting state control in 
Norway. On the other hand, Iceland, Finland, Japan, and Belgium have improved their relative position 
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and, to varying degrees, converged towards the most liberal OECD countries.15 The remaining countries –
 Sweden, Germany, and Portugal – have broadly maintained the relative positions they held in 1998.  
Summing up 
39. As in 1998, the PMR indicators are in many cases not statistically different across countries in 
2003 when uncertainty in the choice of weights used to calculate the overall PMR indicator is taken into 
account (Figure 10). However, once again, two broad groups of countries can be identified at conventional 
degrees of confidence. The ‘relatively liberal’ countries have barely changed since 1998 and now include 
Iceland, in addition to the common-law countries and Denmark. The ‘relatively restrictive’ countries in 
2003 include Poland, Turkey, Mexico, Hungary, Greece, Italy, Czech Republic, and France. Thus, Korea 
and Spain have moved to the group of ‘middle of the road’ countries.  
Figure 10. 
 Country groupings based on confidence intervals for the PMR indicators, 20031,2
2. The scale of the indicator is 0-6 from least to most restrictive of competition.
                                  (at 90 per cent levels)
1. The confidence intervals are calculated using stochastic weights on the low-level indicators to generate a distribution of overall 
PMR indicators for each country. The 90 per cent confidence intervals are calculated from that distribution. Indicator values for the 
'relatively liberal' and 'relatively restrictive' countries are significantly different at the 90 percent level of confidence.
0
1
2
3
4
Un
ite
d K
ing
do
m
Au
str
ali
a
Un
ite
d S
tat
es
Ne
w
 
Ze
ala
nd
Ca
na
da
Ice
lan
d
De
nm
ar
k
Slo
va
k R
ep
ub
lic
Ire
lan
d
Lu
xe
m
bo
ur
g
Sw
ed
en
Ja
pa
n
Fin
lan
d
Ne
the
rla
nd
s
Ge
rm
an
y
Au
str
ia
Be
lgi
um
No
rw
ay
Po
rtu
ga
l
Sp
ain
Ko
re
a
Sw
itz
er
lan
d
Fra
nc
e
Cz
ec
h. 
Re
p.
Ita
ly
Gr
ee
ce
Hu
ng
ar
y
Me
xic
o
Tu
rke
y
Po
lan
d
Product market regulation
90% confidence interval (2003) 2003 PMR Indicator
Relatively Restrictive
Relatively Liberal
 
 
                                                     
15 Note, however, that this result for Iceland is highly sensitive to the weights used in calculating the 
indicator. (Figure 10). 
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4. Consistency across policy domains 
40. This section investigates the extent to which the policy approaches adopted by OECD countries 
in different regulatory areas are linked. It describes the observed empirical relationships between different 
aspects of product market regulation captured within the PMR indicators system as well as between 
product market and selected labour market policies. The focus here is predominantly empirical with only 
limited conjecture on possible explanations and consequences of the observed relationships. 
4.1 Consistency across product market policies 
41. One straight-forward method of assessing the extent of consistency in the policy areas covered by 
the 16 low-level indicators in the PMR system is simply to look at their variance within countries. A high 
variance would signal situations in which countries have relatively marked differences in the extent to 
which policies in different areas are conducive to competition; lower variances would point to policies that 
are either uniformly restrictive, or liberal, or somewhere in between, across the different areas of product 
market regulation.16  
42. According to this metric, the dispersion of regulatory practice has declined between 1998 and 
2003 for most countries, implying increased consistency of product market regulations (Table 2). Countries 
that have increased consistency most strongly include Italy, Japan, Sweden, and Korea. Given the overall 
improvement in product market regulation, this may indicate that recent reform efforts in these countries 
have been directed at regulatory domains that were problem areas in the past. Countries that have moved in 
the other direction include Turkey, Mexico, Poland, Spain, and New Zealand. For these countries, to the 
extent that complementarities exist between policy areas, there is a danger that the potential benefits of 
recent product market reforms may be reduced given ongoing restrictions in other areas. 
43. It is also interesting to note that the variability of regulatory approaches tends to increase as the 
regulatory environment (measured by the overall PMR indicator) becomes more restrictive across 
countries (Figure 11). Put differently, countries with relatively liberal product market policies also tend to 
have a more uniform approach across regulatory domains, and vice versa.17 In countries with restrictive 
product market policies, the relatively diverse mix of policies could be open to two conflicting 
interpretations: it could be indicative of either inconsistent policy setting, or, more optimistically, an 
ongoing reform process. 
                                                     
16 The width of the confidence intervals calculated using the random weights technique is also a measure of 
variance in the 16 low-level indicators. Countries that have relatively similar scores for all of the low-level 
indicator values will score a relatively similar overall PMR indicator value irrespective of the weights used 
in the aggregation process. This will translate into a relatively narrow 90% confidence interval. However, 
for countries with a larger variance across the low-level indicators the overall PMR indicator will vary 
considerably depending on the weights used in its construction and the confidence interval will be 
relatively wide. Hence, the width of the confidence interval also provides a graphical measure of policy 
consistency within each country at this level.  
17 To some extent this is to be expected given that the variance of the low-level indicators in a perfectly 
liberal and perfectly restrictive country would be zero in both cases.  
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Table 2. Within-country variance of low-level PMR indicators, 1998 and 2003
Australia Austria Belgium Canada Czech republic Denmark Finland France Germany Greece
1998 1.0 2.5 2.7 0.8 2.3 1.7 1.7 2.3 1.6 2.3
2003 0.9 1.9 1.9 0.7 1.6 1.2 1.3 1.7 1.4 2.0
Hungary Iceland Ireland Italy Japan Korea Luxembourg Mexico Netherlands New Zealand
1998 2.4 1.5 1.9 4.0 2.6 2.0 1.7 1.3 1.1
2003 1.7 1.4 1.7 2.0 1.0 1.0 1.5 2.7 1.2 1.3
Norway Poland Portugal Slovak Republic Spain Sweden Switzerland Turkey United Kingdom United States
1998 1.9 2.1 1.5 1.9 2.1 2.9 2.1 0.8 1.2
2003 1.9 3.0 1.3 1.1 2.1 1.1 2.4 3.5 0.7 0.5
 
 
 
1. The scale of the indicator is 0-6 from least to most restrictive of competition.
Figure 11. The relationship between the level of overall regulation and policy consistency         
in OECD countries 1
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44. Across broader regulatory domains the consistency of product market regulations can be assessed 
by investigating relationships between pairs of PMR indicators at higher levels of the hierarchy. Three 
possible relationships are considered here: inward and outward-oriented policies;18 economic and 
administrative regulations;19 and, at a more detailed level, the scope of public enterprises and legal barriers 
to competition. 
45. As mentioned above, supranational institutions and agreements tend to engender liberalisation in 
outward-oriented policies across all participant countries irrespective of their domestic policy settings. 
Notwithstanding this, there is a significant correlation between barriers to trade and investment in OECD 
countries and domestic barriers to competition (Figure 12).20 In other words, relatively open economies 
also tend to have relatively liberal domestic policy settings. This may reflect a ‘political economy effect’ 
whereby openness to trade and international investment generates pressures for domestic policy reform. 
46. In 1998, countries that had restrictive economic regulations also tended to impose burdensome 
administrative procedures on business enterprises. Although subsequent reform has, in general, been 
somewhat asymmetric in favour of reducing economic regulations (especially state control), the positive 
correlation between these two regulatory areas has persisted into 2003 (Figure 13). There are at least two 
potential reasons to expect a degree of consistency between economic and administrative regulations. On 
the one hand, reforms that liberalise market access and enhance the role of market-based mechanisms may 
also bring about a reduction in administrative procedures and burdens, thus enhancing the positive effects 
on competition. On the other hand, a less burdensome administrative environment may make it easier to 
reform economic regulations that must be endorsed and implemented by national and/or local 
administrations. In this case, administrative simplification may constitute a pre-condition for reforms in 
other areas (OECD, 2003; Koromzay, 2004; Nicoletti, 2004). 
47. Finally, as was the case in 1998, market access is frequently restricted by laws and regulations in 
industries in which the state often has ownership involvement (Figure 14). Although the correlation 
between these two indicators remains high, the difference between network and other sectors has become 
less distinct as reform in a number of countries has liberalised access to network industries that are still 
dominated by public (or semi-public) enterprises. At the same time, the frequency of restrictions and state 
ownership in industries that are inherently competitive (e.g. tobacco, air transport, communications) has 
fallen in some cases. 
4.2 The relationship between product market regulation and labour market policies 
48. Looking beyond the product market, empirical evidence suggests a positive relationship between 
product and labour market reforms in the OECD countries with the former often preceding the latter 
(Brandt, et al. 2005). The evidence also continues to suggest a positive relationship between employment 
protection legislation (EPL) and product market regulation across OECD countries (Figure 15). Thus, as 
                                                     
18 Inward-oriented policies include state control and barriers to entrepreneurship whereas outward-oriented 
policy indicators include barriers to trade and investment. 
19 Administrative regulation includes reporting, information and application procedures, and the burdens on 
business start-ups, implied by both economy-wide and sector-level requirements. Economic regulation 
includes all other domestic regulatory provisions affecting private governance and product market 
competition (such as state control and legal barriers to entry in competitive markets). 
20 Note that in the 1998 version of the PMR indicators no evidence of a relationship between outward and 
inward-oriented policies was found (OECD, 1999). However, the correlation between inward and outward-
oriented policies remains significant in the subset of OECD countries that were covered in the 1998 
analysis implying that this result has changed given revisions to the 1998 regulatory data. 
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already observed in 1998, restrictive product market regulation tends to be matched by analogous EPL 
restrictions. 
49. There are several potential reasons why some aspects of labour and product market policies 
might be positively correlated. For instance, because product market liberalisation reduces the rents 
accruing to firms, it may also reduce the incentive for labour to maintain or increase bargaining power 
aimed at capturing part of these rents (Blanchard and Giavazzi, 2003), or protecting ‘insiders’ by means of 
restrictive EPL (Saint Paul, 1996). Firms in competitive markets may also find it less easy to bear the cost 
of restrictive EPL, while workers may have less incentive to protect their jobs if alternative employment 
opportunities are enhanced by the positive effect of easier product market regulation on overall 
employment (Koeniger and Vindigni, 2003).21 As shown elsewhere (OECD, 2004), EPL has not changed a 
great deal over the past five years, especially for workers with permanent contracts. Thus, since the late 
1990s, many OECD countries have made more progress in reforming product market regulation than EPL. 
If these policies are indeed political complements, this could suggest that better conditions for future 
labour market reforms may have been established.  
 
                                                     
21 There is an increasing amount of research pointing to positive effects of product market competition on 
employment, both in theory (Blanchard and Giavazzi, 2003; Pissarides, 2001; Haefke and Ebell, 2004) and 
with reference to the experience of OECD countries (Boeri et al, 2000; Nicoletti et al., 2001; Kugler and 
Pica, 2003; Nicoletti and Scarpetta, 2004).  
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Panel A. 1998
Panel B. 2003
1. Inward-oriented policies include state control and barriers to entrepreneurship whereas outward-oriented policy indicators include 
barriers to trade and investment.
Figure 12. Outward and inward-oriented policies1, 1998 and 2003
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Figure 13.
 Administrative and economic regulations1, 1998 and 2003
Panel A. 1998
Panel B. 2003
1.Administrative regulation includes reporting, information and application procedures, and the burdens on business start-ups, 
implied by both economy-wide and sector-level requirements. Economic regulation includes all other domestic regulatory provisions 
affecting private governance and product market competition (such as state control and legal barriers to entry in competitive markets).
The scale of the indicators is 0-6 from least to most restrictive of competition.
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\
Figure 14. Public enterprises and legal barriers to competition, 1998 and 2003
Panel B. 2003
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Figure 15. Product market regulation and employment protection legislation, 1998 and 2003
Panel A, 1998
Panel B, 2003
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5. Conclusions and future developments 
50. A number of conclusions about the recent evolution of product market policies in OECD 
countries can be drawn from the update of the PMR indicators: 
• Regulatory impediments to product market competition have declined in the OECD area in recent 
years. The extent of government involvement in product markets and barriers to international 
flows of capital and trade have fallen considerably. The fall in barriers to entrepreneurship has 
been slightly less significant. Notwithstanding recent progress in product market reform, across 
virtually all countries a ‘hard core’ of regulations that impede competition still persists in some 
areas, such as barriers to entry in non-manufacturing industries. 
• In some respects, product market regulation has become more homogenous across the OECD in 
the past five years, as countries with relatively restrictive product market policies have moved 
towards the regulatory environment of the more liberalised countries. This convergence pattern 
has been most apparent in policies governing the extent of the state’s involvement in product 
markets. There is also evidence of convergence in policy-induced barriers to entrepreneurship, 
whereas policies governing barriers to international trade and investment have tended to be 
relatively homogenous. However, despite a degree of convergence in product market regulation, 
differences between broad groups of countries that have ‘relatively liberal’ and ‘relatively 
restrictive’ regulatory environments are still significant. 
• The overall approach to product market regulation has also become more consistent across 
regulatory domains within many OECD countries, suggesting that recent reform efforts may have 
been focused on areas where regulation was previously particularly heavy. Also, countries with 
restrictive overall product market regulations tend to have a more heterogeneous approach to 
competition across different policy areas, which may imply additional efficiency losses. 
• Finally, as was the case in 1998, cross-country correlations between different aspects of product 
market regulation are also apparent in the 2003 indicators. Domestic impediments to competition 
tend to be lower in countries that have lower barriers to foreign trade and investment suggesting a 
link between a country’s degree of openness and domestic policy reform. In addition, restrictive 
economic regulations still tend to be associated with burdensome administrative environments, 
and legal barriers frequently block new entry into sectors in which publicly-controlled companies 
operate. Product market regulation also appears to be linked to employment protection 
legislation, raising the question of whether policies in the two regulatory areas are ‘political 
complements’. 
51. Given the general tendency for convergence in the broad features of product market regulation, 
differences in the regulatory regimes of OECD countries that have potentially important consequences for 
product market competition are becoming more subtle. In this environment the ability of the PMR system 
to capture country-specific nuances in regulation, while at the same time remaining comparable across 
countries, becomes increasingly important, especially for countries with relatively liberal product market 
policies. There are a number of ways in which the PMR indicators could be improved in the future so as to 
better differentiate across countries by capturing policies that are relevant for competition. 
52. First, the existing indicators could be expanded to incorporate a range of additional economic 
information that is available from the responses to the OECD Regulatory Questionnaire and other sources, 
but not currently included in the system. For example, the sectoral coverage of the indicators could be 
increased by expanding the number of sectors over which indicators such as the ‘scope of public 
enterprise’ and ‘legal barriers to entry’ are calculated. The number of sectors used in the calculation of the 
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indicators of barriers to foreign ownership and sector-specific administrative burdens could also be 
increased. As well as expanding the coverage of existing indicators new data could be used to refine some 
of the low-level indicators currently used in the system. For example, data on the number of hours that 
retail outlets are typically able to trade could be used to determine the extent to which retail trade is 
regulated (if at all) or additional information on effective trade protection – such as producer support for 
agriculture –  could be incorporated into the indicator of barriers to trade. 
53. Second, additional sectoral information could also be used to construct new indicators that would 
be incorporated into the PMR framework. Although the current version of the PMR indicators incorporates 
data on network industries, this could be expanded and developed into comprehensive low-level indicators 
of barriers to entry and public ownership in network industries for each country. These low-level indicators 
would be modelled on existing OECD indicators, which reflect the regulation of network industries since 
1975 (see, for instance, Nicoletti and Scarpetta, 2003), making the two sets of indicators more compatible. 
Existing data on the regulation of professional services in OECD countries could also be included in the 
system. More ambitiously, the PMR system could be expanded to cover other policy domains, such as  
antitrust policy and financial market regulation.  
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ANNEX 
54. This annex provides a detailed description of how the low-level PMR indicators are constructed 
from the basic regulatory data (Section 1.1). It also describes and documents the weights used to combine 
the low-level indicators into the summary indicators (Section 1.2) and provides the PMR indicator values 
(Section 1.3).  
1.1 The low-level indicators 
55. Tables 1 to 16 show the basic data that enter each of the low-level indicators (either replies to the 
OECD questionnaire or data from other sources), the subjective weights assigned to each of these data, and 
the scores attached to each of the regulatory provisions (shaded in grey).  
56. Note that in the process of updating the PMR indicators some minor changes have been made to 
the design of the low-level indicators as described in Nicoletti, et al (1999). In particular:  
• Two low-level indicators that were calculated separately in the 1998 work – ‘special voting 
rights’ and ‘control of public enterprise by legislative bodies’ – have been combined into the 
indicator of ‘direct control over business enterprises’. This was done because of significant 
complementarity in the aspects of regulation captured by the two 1998 indicators. In addition, the 
1998 indicator of ‘control of public enterprise by legislative bodies’ was calculated using only 
one data point. 
• In the 1998 work, replies to two questions from the OECD regulatory indicators questionnaire 
were used twice in the construction of two separate indicators. This duplication has been 
removed. 
• In a few of the low-level indicators regulatory information is normalised across countries. The 
method for doing this normalisation has been standardised across indicators.  
• The indicator of ‘licenses and permits’ has been removed from the system of weights used in the 
indicator of ‘communication and simplification of rules and procedures’. 
• Data on whether regulation sets conditions for driving and resting periods has been removed from 
the indicator of ‘command and control regulation’.  
• The ‘human health’ and ‘other urban, suburban, and inter-urban passenger transport’ sectors have 
been removed from the indicator of legal barriers given evidence of inconsistent interpretation 
across countries.  
 These design revisions have been applied to the 1998 and 2003 indicators and have had only a very 
minor impact on the indicator values.  
57. The technique used to deal with any missing data depends on the severity of the problem. If a 
sufficiently small amount of data is missing from the calculation of a given indicator then the indicator is 
calculated on the basis of the available data. The precise formulae for doing this differ slightly across 
indicators and are described in detail in footnotes to Tables 1 to 16.  
58. When there is no or very little data available to calculate a given low-level indicator it is 
estimated on the basis of other information. In the 2003 PMR indicators, if the missing data were available 
in 1998, then the 1998 indicator value is used as the estimate for 2003. Otherwise, and in the case of 
missing indicators in 1998, the estimate is based on the values of other indicators in the same economic 
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domain as the missing indicator. For estimating missing indicator values in this case the low-level 
indicators are divided into the following four economic domains:  
• State control: (Scope of public enterprise sector, Size of public enterprise sector, Direct control 
over business enterprise, Use of command & control regulation, Price controls). 
• Regulatory and administrative opacity and Administrative burdens on startups: (License and 
permits system, Communication and simplification of rules and procedures, Administrative 
burdens for corporation, Administrative burdens for sole proprietor firms, Sector-specific 
administrative burdens). 
• Barriers to competition: (Legal barriers, Antitrust exemptions). 
• Barrier to trade and investment: (Ownership barriers, Discriminatory procedures, Regulatory 
barriers, Tariffs). 
59. The estimation technique effectively calculates the missing indicator value as the average of the 
(normalised) indicator values in the same regulatory domain. That is, the estimate of indicator i for country 
j (denoted estijE ) is calculated as:  
 ( ) 
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 where δ is the set of indicators in the same economic domain as Ej and at least one Eij is available 
in the domain. Given the very high response rate to the OECD regulatory indicators questionnaire the 
overall indicator values for each country in 2003 are likely to be relatively robust to different techniques 
for estimating missing data. 
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Table 1. Low-level indicators: scope of public enterprise sector 
National, state or provincial government controls at least one firm in: Coding of answers 
ISIC 
(Rev. 3.1) 
code 
Sector 
Weight 
(ai) Yes No 
16 Manufacture of tobacco products 1 6 0 
232 Manufacture of refined petroleum products 1 6 0 
27 Manufacture of basic metals 1 6 0 
28, 29 Manufacture of fabricated metal products, machinery and equipment  1 6 0 
4010 Electricity: electricity generation/import or electricity transmission or electricity distribution or electricity supply 1 6 0 
4020 Gas: gas production/import or gas transmission or gas distribution or gas 
supply 1 6 0 
4100 Collection, purification and distribution of water  1 6 0 
50, 51 Wholesale trade, incl. motor vehicles  1 6 0 
55 Restaurant and hotels 1 6 0 
601, 6303 Railways: Passenger transport via railways, Freight transport via railways, Operation of railroad infrastructure 1 6 0 
6021 Other urban, suburban and interurban passenger transport  1 6 0 
6021 Other scheduled passenger land transport 1 6 0 
6023 Freight transport by road 1 6 0 
6303 Operation of road infrastructure  1 6 0 
61 Water transport 1 6 0 
6303 Operation of water transport infrastructure 1 6 0 
62 Air transport  1 6 0 
6303 Operation of air transport infrastructure 1 6 0 
642 Telecommunication: fixed line services, mobile services, internet services.  1 6 0 
6519, 659, 671 Financial institutions 1 6 0 
66, 672 Insurance 1 6 0 
74 Other business activity 1 6 0 
851  Human health activities  1 6 0 
9211, 9212 Motion picture distribution and projection 1 6 0 
Country score (0-6) 
 (Σiai answeri)/ Σiai 
Note: The indicator is computed only if at least 20 data points are available. 
Network industries: 
Electricity: a YES is recorded if national, state or provincial government controls at least one firm in any of the following sectors: 
electricity generation/import, electricity transmission, electricity distribution/supply. 
Gas: a YES is recorded if national, state or provincial government controls at least one firm in any of the following sectors: gas 
production/import,  gas transmission, gas distribution/supply 
Railways: a YES is recorded if national, state or provincial government controls at least one firm in any of the following sectors: 
passenger transport via railways, freight transport via railways, operation of railroad infrastructure 
Telecommunication: a YES is recorded if national, state or provincial government controls at least one firm in any of the 
following sectors: fixed line services, mobile services, and internet services. 
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Table 2. Low-level indicators: size of public enterprise sector 
 
Size in 1995 Retrenchment 1995-
2003 
Size in 1998 and 
2003 
 
A B C D E 
Source CEEP (1997) Gwartney and Lawson 
(1997) 
OECD estimate 
based on A and B 
Privatization 
Barometer, 
Fondazione Eni 
Enrico Mattei and 
Fondazione IRI  
OECD estimate 
based on C and D 
Definition of 
indicator 
State ownership in the 
non-agricultural business 
sector (overall and by 
sector) 
Size of government 
enterprises as a share of 
economy 
Size of public 
enterprise sector 
Privatisation 
proceeds 
Size of public 
enterprise sector 
Units % of 1995 non-
agricultural business 
GDP 
Index: scale 0-10 from 
largest to smallest size 
Index: scale 0-10 
from largest to 
smallest size 
% of GDP Index: 0-6 scale from 
smallest to largest 
size 
Coverage 15 European countries 115 OECD and non-
OECD countries 
29 OECD countries All OECD countries 29 OECD countries 
Criterion for 
scale 
 10 = less than 1% 
8 = only natural 
monopolies 
6 = less than 10% 
4 = more than 10% less 
than 20% 
2 = more than 20% less 
than 30% 
0 = more than 30% 
Gwartney and 
Lawson index 
revised and updated 
with CEEP data 
 (C-0.2*D) 
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Table 3. Low-level indicators: direct control over business enterprises 
Coding of answers 
  
Question weight 
bi 
Sub-
question 
weight 
ai 
Yes No 
General constraints      
There are any legal or constitutional constraints to the sale of 
the stakes held by government in these firms      0.3*si  6 0 
Strategic choices of any publicly-controlled firms have to be 
reviewed and/or cleared in advance by national, state, or 
provincial legislatures 
      0.2*si  6 0 
Golden shares     
National, state or provincial governments have special voting 
rights (e.g. golden shares) in any firms within the business 
sector 
.25  6 0 
Extent of the special voting rights 
These special rights can be exercised in: 
.25   
- merger with or acquisition by another company   1/4 6 0 
- change in controlling coalition   1/4 6 0 
- choice of management   1/4 6 0 
- strategic management decisions   1/4 6 0 
Country scores (0-6) i
i
ii
i
i answerabanswerb ⋅⋅+⋅ ∑∑
=
4
3
1
 
 
Note: si =  % of business sectors in which the state controls at least one firm 
Missing data point rules: 
- if the circumstances under which a special voting right can be exercised are not known, only the existence of the special voting right is 
taken into account to compute the golden share element. 
- if no data are available concerning the strategic choices element, only the data concerning the legal and constitutional constraints are 
taken into account with a weight of 50% 
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Table 4. Low-level indicators: use of command and control regulation 
Coding of 
answers 
  
General vs. 
industry-
specific 
weights 
(ai) 
Industry 
weights  
(bj) 
Question  
weights 
(ck) Yes No 
General information 1/2      
Regulators are required to assess alternative policy instruments 
(regulatory and non-regulatory) before adopting new regulation   1/2 0 6 
Guidance has been issued on using alternatives to traditional 
regulation   1/2 0 6 
Sector-specific information 1/2     
Road freight  1/4    
Regulations prevent or constrain backhauling  
(picking up freight on the return leg)   1/4 6 0 
Regulations prevent or constrain private carriage (transport only 
for own account)   1/4 6 0 
Regulations prevent or constrain contract carriage  
(contractual relation between an otherwise independent hauler 
and one shipper) 
  1/4 6 0 
Regulations prevent or constrain intermodal operations  
(operating or ownership links between firms in different 
transportation sectors) 
  1/4 6 0 
Retail distribution  1/4    
Shop opening hours are regulated   2/3 6 0 
Government regulations on shop opening hours apply at national 
level   1/3 6 0 
The regulation of opening hours became more flexible in the last 
5 years    -0.5
1
 0 
Air travel  1/4    
Carriers operating on domestic routes are subject to universal 
service requirements (e.g. obligation to serve specified 
customers or areas) 
  1 6 0 
Railways  1/4    
Companies operating the infrastructure or providing railway 
services are subject to universal service requirements (e.g. 
obligation to serve specified customers or areas) 
    1 6 0 
Country scores (0-6) Σiai Σjbj Σkck answerijk 
Note: In case of missing data points the sector-specific element is a simple average of the available sectoral sub-elements. 
1. If answer is “yes”, 0.5 is subtracted from the industry-specific score. 
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Table 5. Low-level indicators: price controls 
Coding of answers 
 
Industry  
Weights 
(bj) 
Question  
weights  
(ck) Yes No 
Air travel 1/4   
 
Prices of domestic air fares are regulated  1/2 6 0 
Number of 5 or 4 busiest international routes subject to price regulation (n)  1/2 (n/5)*6 or (n/4)*6 
Road freight 1/4   
 
Retail prices of road freight services are regulated in any way by the 
government  1/3 6 0 
Government provides pricing guidelines to road freight companies  1/3 6 0 
Professional bodies or representatives of trade and commercial interests are 
involved in specifying or enforcing pricing guidelines or regulations  1/3 6 0 
Retail distribution 1/4   
Retail prices of the following products are subject to price controls:      
- Retail prices of  certain staples (e.g. milk and bread)   1/6 6 0 
- Retail prices of gasoline   1/6 6 0 
- Retail prices of  tobacco   1/6 6 0 
- Retail prices of  alcohol   1/6 6 0 
- Retail prices of pharmaceuticals   1/6 6 0 
- Retail prices of other product   1/6 6 0 
Telecommunication    
 
Retail prices of digital mobile service in telecommunications are regulated 1/4 1 6 0 
Country scores (0-6) Σjbj Σkck answerjk 
Note: Missing data point: -   in the case of missing data in the sub-element of air travel or road freight, a simple average of the available 
data points is used.  
-  in the case of missing data in the types of retail price controls, a simple average of the available data points is 
used. 
-  the overall indicator is a simple average of the available sub-elements (air travel, road freight, retail distribution 
telecommunication) 
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Table 6. Low-level indicators: licenses and permits system 
Coding of answers 
  
Question  
Weights 
(ck) Yes No 
The 'silence is consent' rule (i.e.  that licenses are issued automatically if the 
competent licensing office has not acted by the end of the statutory response 
period) is used at all 
1/3 0 6 
There are single contact points (“one-stop shops”)  for getting information on 
notifications and licenses 1/3 0 6 
There are single contact points (“one-stop shops”) for issuing or accepting on 
notifications and licenses 1/3 0 6 
Country scores (0-6) Σkck answerjk 
Note: Missing data points: if at least two of the three data points are available, the indicator is calculated as a simple average of 
the available data points. 
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Table 7. Low-level indicators: communication and simplification of rules and procedures 
Coding of answers 
  
Weights 
by theme  
(bj) 
Question  
Weights 
(ck) Yes No 
Communication1 1/2    
There are systematic procedures for making regulations known 
and accessible to affected parties  2/12 0 6 
There is a general policy requiring "plain language" drafting of 
regulation  1/12 0 6 
There are inquiry points where affected or interested foreign 
parties can get information on the operation and enforcement of 
regulations 
 3/12 0 6 
Yes or  
in all cases 
In some 
cases 
No Affected parties have the right to appeal against adverse 
enforcement decisions in individual cases  4/12 
0 3 6 
Government 
Wide 
For some 
sectors No Government policy imposes specific requirements in relation to transparency/freedom of information government wide  2/12 
0 3 6 
Simplification(2) 1/2*Wi / Max W98   
National government (all ministries and agencies) keeps a 
complete count of the number of permits and licenses required   1/3 0 6 
There is an explicit program to reduce the administrative 
burdens imposed by government on enterprises and/or citizens  1/3 0 6 
There is a program underway to review and reduce the number 
of licenses and permits required by the national government 
 
 1/3 0 6 
Country scores (0-6) Σjbj Σkck answerjk 
Note: 1. Compared to 1998, the design of this indicator has been changed: the question concerning the publications of regulation at international 
level, which was also used elsewhere, has been removed.  
Note: 2.  In the weight on the simplification element Wi is a simple average of the indicators of: Administrative burdens on corporations, 
administrative burdens on sole proprietor firms, sector-specific administrative burdens, and communication. 
 Missing data point: - for the simplification element if at least two of the three data points are available, a simple average of the available 
data is used 
 - for the communication element, if at least four data points are available, a weighted average of the available data 
is used. 
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Table 8. Low-level indicators: administrative burdens for corporations 
Coding of answers 
 
Weight 
(ck) 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Number of mandatory procedures required 
to register a public limited company 
(pre-registration+registration) 
1/4 <=4.8 <=8 <=12.8 <=19.2 <=25.6 <=32 >32 
Number of public and private bodies to 
contact to register a public limited company 
(pre-registration+registration) 
1/4 <=1 <=3 <=5 <=7 <=9 <=11 >11 
Number of working days required to 
complete all mandatory procedures for 
registering a public limited company 
(pre-registration+registration) 
1/4 <=16.4 <=32.8 <=49.2 <=65.6 <=82 <=98.4 >98.4 
Total cost (euros) of  
registering a public limited company  
(pre-registration+registration) 
1/4 <=500 <=1000 <=1500 <=2500 <=5000 <=7500 >7500 
Country scores (0-6) Σkck answerk 
Note: The thresholds used to classify data on the number of procedures required and the number of bodies involved in registering a firm 
has been changed to reflect the scaling of the 1998 data (discussed in annex 2). The net effect of both these changes leaves the 
value of the 1998 indicators unchanged.  
Missing data: If no more than 1 element is missing the indicator is calculated as a simple average of the available data. 
 
 
Table 9. Low-level indicators: administrative burdens for sole proprietor firms 
Coding of answers 
  
Weight 
(ck) 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Number of mandatory procedures required 
to register a public limited company 
(pre-registration+registration) 
 1/4 <=1.6 <=3.2 <=4.8 <=8 <=11.2 <=14.4 >14.4 
Number of public and private bodies to 
contact to register a public limited company 
(pre-registration+registration) 
 1/4 <=1 <=3 <=5 <=8 <=10 <=12 <12 
Number of working days required to 
complete all mandatory procedures for 
registering a public limited company 
(pre-registration+registration) 
 1/4 <=7.2 <=14.4 <=28.8 <=43.2 <=57.6 <=72 >72 
Total cost (euros) of  
registering a public limited company 
(pre-registration+registration) 
 1/4 0 <100 <300 <500 <750 <1000 <=1000 
Country score (0-6) 
 Σkck (answer)k 
Note: The thresholds used to classify data on the number of procedures required and the number of bodies involved in registering a firm 
has been changed to reflect the scaling of the 1998 data (discussed in annex 2). The net effect of both these changes leaves the 
value of the 1998 indicators unchanged.  
Missing data: If no more than 1 element is missing the indicator is calculated as a simple average of the available data. 
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Table 10. Low-level indicators: sector-specific administrative burdens 
  
Industry 
weights 
(bj) 
Question 
weights 
(ck) 
Coding of answers 
Road freight 1/2*Wi (1)   
 
 
 
Scale for the first element of road 
freight 
In order to establish a national road freight business, operators need 
to obtain a license (other than a driving license) or permit from the 
government or a regulatory agency 
Yes No  No  No  No  
In order to establish a national road freight business, operators need 
to notify any level of government or a regulatory agency and wait for 
approval before they can start operation 
No  Yes No  No  No  
Registration in transport register is required in order to establish a 
new business in the road freight sector No  No  Yes No  No  
In order to operate a national road freight business, operators need to 
notify any level of government or a regulatory agency 
No  No  No  Yes No  
 
 
1/3 
4 3 2 1 0 
 
 
 
Yes No 
There are criteria other than technical and financial fitness and 
compliance with public safety requirements considered in decisions 
on entry of new operators 
 
1/3 1 0 
These entry regulations apply also if a firm wants to transport only for 
its own account 
 
1/3 1 0 
Retail distribution 1/2*Wi (1)  Always required 
Depends 
on type of 
good sold 
or size of 
outlets 
No 
Registration in commercial register is needed to start up a commercial 
activity for selling food products   1/8 6 3 0 
Registration in commercial register is needed to start up a commercial 
activity for selling clothing products   1/8 6 3 0 
Notification to authorities is needed to start up a commercial activity 
for selling food products   1/8 6 3 0 
Notification to authorities is needed to start up a commercial activity 
for selling clothing products   1/8 6 3 0 
Licenses or permits are needed to engage in commercial activity (not 
related to outlet sitting) for selling food products  1/8 6 3 0 
Licenses or permits are needed to engage in commercial activity (not 
related to outlet sitting)  for selling clothing products  1/8 6 3 0 
Licenses or permits are needed for outlet sitting (in addition to 
compliance with general urban planning provisions) for selling food 
products 
 1/8 6 3 0 
Licenses or permits are needed for outlet siting (in addition to 
compliance with general urban planning provisions) for selling clothing 
products 
  1/8 6 3 0 
Country scores (0-6) Σjbj Σkck answerjk 
Note: (1) Normalized value of the indicator of general administrative burdens on startups  Wi=wi / Max w98 
Missing data point: - for the retail distribution sub-element, a simple average of the available data points is used 
 - if only one of the two sub-element (road freight, retail distribution ) is available the overall indicator is still 
computed with the only available sub-element  
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Table 11. Low-level indicators: legal barriers to entry 
National, state or provincial laws or other regulations restrict the number of competitors allowed 
to operate a business in at least some markets in:  Coding of answers 
ISIC 
(rev. 3.1) 
code 
Sector Weight (ai) Yes No 
16 Manufacture of tobacco products 1 6 0 
232 Manufacture of refined petroleum products 1 6 0 
27 Manufacture of basic metals 1 6 0 
28, 29 Manufacture of fabricated metal products, machinery and equipment  1 6 0 
4010 Electricity: electricity generation/import or electricity transmission or electricity supply 1 6 0 
4020 Gas: gas production/import or gas transmission or gas supply 1 6 0 
4100 Collection, purification and distribution of water  1 6 0 
50, 51 Wholesale trade, incl. motor vehicles  1 6 0 
55 Restaurant and hotels 1 6 0 
601, 6303 Railways: Passenger transport via railways, Freight transport via railways, Operation of 
railroad infrastructure 1 6 0 
6021 Other scheduled passenger land transport 1 6 0 
6023 Freight transport by road 1 6 0 
6303 Operation of road infrastructure  1 6 0 
61 Water transport 1 6 0 
6303 Operation of water transport infrastructure 1 6 0 
62 Air transport  1 6 0 
6303 Operation of air transport infrastructure 1 6 0 
642  Telecommunication: fixed-line network, fixed-line services, mobile services, internet 
services 1 6 0 
6519, 
659, 671 Financial institutions 1 6 0 
66, 672 Insurance 1 6 0 
74 Other business activity 1 6 0 
9211, 
9212 Motion picture distribution and projection 1 6 0 
Country scores (0-6) (Σiai answeri)/Σiai  
Note: The indicator is calculated if at least 20 data points are available. 
Network industries: 
Electricity: a YES is recorded if legal barriers restrict entry in any of the following sectors: electricity generation/import, electricity 
transmission, electricity distribution/supply. 
Gas: a YES is recorded if legal barriers restrict entry in any of the following sectors: gas production/import,  gas transmission, gas 
distribution/supply 
Railways: a YES is recorded if legal barriers restrict entry in any of the following sectors: passenger transport via railways, freight 
transport via railways, operation of railroad infrastructure 
Telecommunication: a YES is recorded if legal barriers restrict entry in any of the following sectors: fixed line services, mobile 
services, internet services. 
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Table 12. Low-level indicators: antitrust exemptions for public enterprises or state-mandated actions 
 
Coding of answers 
 
 
Question 
Weights 
(ck) Yes  No 
Is there rule or principle providing for exclusion or exemption from liability 
under the general competition law for conduct that is required or 
authorized by other government authority (in addition to exclusions that 
might apply to complete sectors)? 
¼*W 6 0 
Publicly-controlled firms or undertakings are subject to an exclusion or 
exemption from competition law (horizontal cartels) ¼*W 6 0 
Publicly-controlled firms or undertakings are subject to an exclusion or 
exemption from competition law (vertical restraints or to abuse of 
dominance) 
¼*W 6 0 
Publicly-controlled firms or undertakings are subject to an exclusion or 
exemption from competition law (mergers) 
 
¼*W 6 0 
Country scores (0-6) w∗Σkck answerk / w98max  
Note:  Wi = (Scope of public enterprise sector + Size of public enterprise sector)/2 
 Missing data point: - in case of missing data points, a simple average of the available data points is used 
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Table 14. Low-level indicators: foreign ownership barriers 
Coding of answers 
  
Weights 
by theme 
(bj) 
Question 
Weights 
(ck) Yes No 
General barriers 
      
There are statutory or other legal limits to the 
number or proportion of shares that can be 
acquired by foreign investors in publicly-
controlled firms 
2/3*Wi  6 0 
Special government rights can be exercised in 
the case of acquisition of equity by foreign 
investors 
1/2 
1/3 6 0 
Sector-specific barriers 
 Scale on ceilings to equity shares 
  100 76 to 99% 
50 to 
75% 
36 to 
50% 
21 to 
35% 
1 to 
20% 0 
Ceiling on foreign-owned equity share in 
telecommunications  1/2 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Ceiling on foreign-owned equity share in an 
airline company 
1/2 
1/2 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Country scores (0-6) Σjbj Σkck answerjk 
Notes: Wi: % of business sectors in which the state controls at least one firm 
 
 
 
 
Table 15. Low-level indicators: regulatory barriers 
Coding of answers 
  
Question 
weights 
(ck) Yes No 
The country has engaged in Mutual Recognition Agreements (MRAs) in at least 
a sector with any other country 2/5 0 6 
There are specific provisions which require or encourage regulators to consider 
recognizing the equivalence of regulatory measures or the result of conformity 
assessment performed in other countries, wherever possible and appropriate 
4/15 0 6 
There are specific provisions which require or encourage regulators to use 
internationally harmonized standards and certification procedures wherever 
possible and appropriate 
2/9 0 6 
There are any specific provisions which require or encourage regulatory 
administrative procedures to avoid unnecessary trade restrictiveness 1/9 0 6 
Country scores (0-6) Σkck answerjk 
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Table 16. Low-level indicators: tariff trade barriers 
  
Coding of answers 
Simple average of MFN tariffs <=3% <=6% <=9% <=12% <=15% <=18% >18% 
Country scores (0-6) 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 
 
1.2 The summary indicators: aggregation methodology 
60. To ensure consistency across time the revised 1998 and 2003 low-level indicators are aggregated 
into summary indicators using the same set of weights that were calculated as part of the original 1998 
work. The only difference is that the weights applied to the old 1998 indicators of ‘special voting rights’ 
and ‘control of public enterprise by legislative bodies’ have been added together and applied to the new 
indicator of ‘direct control over business enterprises’, which combines the two previous indicators. The 
weights used in the PMR system are shown Table 17 (and Figure 1 in the main text). 
61. Maintaining consistent weights in the different estimation periods is an important pre-requisite 
for making meaningful comparisons of indicator values in different years. At some point, however, the 
weights used to calculate the PMR indicators may be rebased using the updated indicator values. In any 
case, the results of the ‘random weights technique’ discussed in the paper imply that the main conclusions 
are reasonably robust to the choice of weights used in the PMR indicator system.  
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Table 17. Weights assigned to low-level indicators in selected summary indicators of regulation 
 
First-level 
indicators 
Product  
Market 
 regulation 
Inward-
oriented 
policies 
State 
control 
Barriers 
to 
entrepreneuship 
Barriers 
to trade 
and 
 investment 
Economic 
regulation 
Administrative 
regulation 
Scope of public 
enterprise sector 0.056 0.088 0.179 - - 0.147 - 
Size of public 
enterprise sector 0.053 0.083 0.169 - - 0.095 - 
Direct control 
over business 
enterprises 
0.092 0.143 0.291 - - 0.210 - 
Use of command 
& 
control regulation 
0.062 0.097 0.197 - - 0.125 - 
Price 
controls 0.052 0.081 0.164 - - 0.138 - 
Licence 
and 
permits system 
0.051 0.081 - 0.160 - - 0.201 
Communication and 
simplification of 
rules and 
procedures 
0.044 0.070 - 0.138 - - 0.187 
Administrative 
burdens for 
corporation 
0.052 0.083 - 0.163 - - 0.211 
Administrative 
burdens for 
sole proprietor firms 
0.047 0.075 - 0.147 - - 0.193 
Sector-specific 
administrative 
burdens 
0.049 0.079 - 0.156 - - 0.208 
Legal  
barriers 0.028 0.045 - 0.089 - 0.151 - 
Antitrust 
Exemptions 0.047 0.075 - 0.148 - 0.133 - 
Ownership 
barriers 0.103 - - - 0.280 - - 
Discriminatory 
procedures 0.076 - - - 0.205 - - 
Regulatory 
barriers 0.110 - - - 0.298 - - 
Tariffs 0.080 - - - 0.217 - - 
Total 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 
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1.3 The PMR indicator values 
62. The value of the revised 1998 and 2003 low-level, summary, and overall PMR indicators are 
given in Tables 18 to 24. 
 
Table 18. State control: values of the low-level indicators 
  
State Control 
 
Scope of public 
enterprise 
sector  
 
Size of public 
enterprise 
sector  
 
Direct control 
over business 
enterprise 
 
Use of 
command & 
control 
regulation  
 Price controls 
  1998 2003   1998 2003   1998 2003   1998 2003   1998 2003 
Australia 2.8 2.8  0.8 0.1  0.0 0.0  1.9 0.4  2.5 0.0 
Austria 5.0 3.5  4.3 4.0  0.0 0.0  2.4 2.2  2.7 1.3 
Belgium 2.3 1.8  3.3 3.3  2.6 1.5  4.7 4.5  4.0 1.0 
Canada 2.8 2.8  2.1 2.1  0.8 0.8  1.2 1.3  2.9 2.0 
Czech Republic 4.5 3.8  4.5 3.2  5.3 2.3  2.3 2.3  2.5 1.3 
Denmark 3.0 2.5  2.3 2.3  1.5 0.8  3.9 1.4  0.3 0.0 
Finland 3.5 3.5  4.2 3.2  3.6 2.9  2.9 1.4  1.8 0.3 
France 5.0 4.5  4.3 4.1  1.9 1.9  4.4 3.0  1.7 0.3 
Germany 3.5 3.3  3.4 3.2  2.3 2.3  3.3 1.8  2.5 0.5 
Greece 3.3 3.0  4.4 3.8  4.6 0.9  5.3 5.1  4.7 2.3 
Hungary 4.5 3.5  3.4 3.0  5.3 4.8  2.3 2.3  3.5 2.0 
Iceland 2.8 2.3  3.3 2.8  1.4 0.7  2.5 0.0  1.0 0.3 
Ireland 3.0 2.5  3.3 2.6  1.5 0.8  3.8 3.8  1.8 0.8 
Italy 5.3 4.5  4.2 3.7  5.6 3.5  3.4 1.9  2.8 2.0 
Japan 2.0 2.0  0.0 0.0  0.6 0.6  3.9 3.0  3.9 2.5 
Korea 2.3 2.0  3.4 2.8  3.4 1.0  1.0 1.1  3.3 2.0 
Luxembourg 1.9 3.5  1.2 1.2  1.3 2.9  2.0 1.5  1.2 0.0 
Mexico 3.5 3.0  3.7 3.6  1.1 0.9  2.1 1.7  3.0 1.0 
Netherlands 3.0 2.8  3.2 2.8  3.8 2.0  1.8 1.7  1.3 0.3 
New Zealand 1.5 2.3  1.0 0.8  2.0 2.6  1.5 0.8  1.0 0.0 
Norway 4.8 4.8  4.6 4.0  2.4 2.4  2.2 2.2  2.7 0.8 
Poland 6.0 5.8  5.4 4.6  4.9 3.0  4.5 3.5  1.8 1.6 
Portugal 3.9 3.8  2.5 1.7  4.2 3.8  3.5 2.0  4.0 1.8 
Slovak Republic 
- 1.6  - 0.0  - 3.5  - 0.0  - 0.4 
Spain 4.5 3.5  2.7 2.5  2.3 2.3  4.5 4.4  2.7 0.8 
Sweden 3.7 3.7  3.2 2.7  1.8 0.7  1.5 2.3  1.0 1.0 
Switzerland 3.8 3.8  0.9 0.9  3.4 2.6  1.4 1.2  4.7 2.6 
Turkey 4.8 4.8  4.5 4.3  2.4 1.0  5.1 4.4  3.5 0.6 
United Kingdom 0.8 0.8  1.7 1.6  2.6 2.9  1.9 2.3  1.6 0.4 
United States 2.8 2.5   0.6 0.6   0.8 0.8   1.5 1.5   1.4 0.8 
Bold= estimated indicator due to too many missing data points  
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Table 21. State control: country scores by domain and sub-domain1 
  Domain   Sub-Domain 
  
State control   Public ownership  
Involvement in 
business operation 
  1998 2003   1998 2003   1998 2003 
Australia 1.4 0.6   1.1 0.8  1.9 0.3 
Austria 2.5 1.9   2.7 2.2  2.3 1.6 
Belgium 3.3 2.4   2.8 2.2  4.0 2.6 
Canada 1.8 1.7   1.8 1.7  1.8 1.5 
Czech Republic 3.9 2.5   4.8 3.0  2.9 1.9 
Denmark 2.2 1.3   2.2 1.7  2.1 0.8 
Finland 3.3 2.3   3.7 3.2  2.6 1.3 
France 3.3 2.7   3.5 3.3  3.0 1.9 
Germany 2.9 2.2   3.0 2.8  2.9 1.5 
Greece 4.5 2.8   4.2 2.4  4.9 3.3 
Hungary 3.9 3.3   4.5 3.8  3.3 2.6 
Iceland 2.1 1.1   2.4 1.8  1.8 0.3 
Ireland 2.6 2.0   2.5 1.8  2.7 2.1 
Italy 4.4 3.2   5.1 3.8  3.6 2.3 
Japan 1.9 1.5   0.9 0.8  3.3 2.4 
Korea 2.7 1.7   3.0 1.8  2.2 1.5 
Luxembourg 
- 2.0   - 2.6  - 1.2 
Mexico 2.5 1.9   2.5 2.3  2.3 1.4 
Netherlands 2.7 1.9   3.3 2.5  2.0 1.2 
New Zealand 1.5 1.4   1.5 1.9  1.4 0.8 
Norway 3.2 2.8   3.7 3.5  2.5 1.8 
Poland 4.6 3.6   5.3 4.2  3.6 2.8 
Portugal 3.7 2.7   3.6 3.1  3.8 2.2 
Slovak Republic 
- 1.4   - 1.9  - 0.8 
Spain 3.2 2.7   3.0 2.7  3.5 2.7 
Sweden 2.2 1.9   2.7 2.2  1.5 1.6 
Switzerland 2.8 2.2   2.7 2.4  3.0 2.1 
Turkey 3.9 2.8   3.7 3.1  4.1 2.5 
United Kingdom 1.8 1.7   1.8 1.9  1.8 1.6 
United States 1.4 1.2   1.3 1.2  1.4 1.2 
1 Sub-domains correspond to principal components found in the 1998 analysis (see Nicoletti et al, 1999).
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Table 22. Barriers to entrepreneurship: country scores by domain and sub-domain1 
  Domain   Sub-Domain 
  Barriers to 
entrepreneurship  
Administrative 
burdens on startups  
Regulatory and 
administrative opacity  
Barriers to 
competition 
  1998 2003   1998 2003   1998 2003   1998 2003 
Australia 1.4 1.1  1.1 1.0  1.5 1.2  1.8 1.5 
Austria 1.7 1.6  2.6 2.8  0.6 0.4  1.0 0.8 
Belgium 1.9 1.6  1.3 1.7  3.3 2.2  1.0 0.6 
Canada 1.0 0.8  1.4 0.9  0.6 0.5  0.7 0.7 
Czech Republic 2.0 1.9  2.2 2.3  2.7 2.3  0.6 0.5 
Denmark 1.4 1.2  0.5 0.5  2.4 2.1  2.1 1.7 
Finland 2.1 1.1  2.0 1.3  3.2 1.2  0.7 0.4 
France 2.8 1.6  3.4 1.9  2.7 1.3  1.5 1.4 
Germany 2.0 1.6  2.4 1.6  2.6 2.2  0.4 0.5 
Greece 2.1 1.6  3.0 2.6  1.7 0.6  0.6 0.5 
Hungary 1.6 1.4  2.4 2.3  0.4 0.4  1.5 1.1 
Iceland 1.8 1.6  1.7 1.4  2.7 2.4  0.8 0.7 
Ireland 1.2 0.9  0.9 0.5  2.2 2.1  0.2 0.3 
Italy 2.7 1.4  4.6 2.4  0.7 0.4  1.0 0.6 
Japan 2.4 1.4  2.1 1.9  3.8 1.2  1.0 0.6 
Korea 2.5 1.7  2.2 2.2  3.8 1.2  1.3 1.0 
Luxembourg 
- 1.2  - 1.8  - 1.1  - 0.1 
Mexico 2.7 2.2  3.4 3.1  2.4 0.4  1.4 2.9 
Netherlands 1.9 1.6  1.8 1.6  2.4 2.5  1.2 0.6 
New Zealand 1.2 1.2  1.0 0.8  2.2 2.2  0.4 0.4 
Norway 1.5 1.0  1.8 1.0  1.3 1.2  0.8 0.6 
Poland 2.8 2.3  3.8 3.7  2.0 1.5  1.6 0.3 
Portugal 1.8 1.3  2.1 1.7  1.8 1.2  1.0 0.5 
Slovak Republic 
- 1.2  - 1.9  - 0.7  - 0.3 
Spain 2.3 1.6  3.5 2.8  1.6 0.4  0.5 0.4 
Sweden 1.9 1.1  1.1 1.2  3.5 1.1  1.3 0.6 
Switzerland 2.3 1.9  2.2 1.7  3.4 3.1  0.8 0.7 
Turkey 3.2 2.5  2.7 2.7  4.1 3.4  3.2 0.5 
United Kingdom 1.1 0.8  1.0 0.7  1.7 1.2  0.7 0.4 
United States 1.5 1.2   0.9 1.0   2.3 1.3   1.5 1.5 
1 Sub-domains correspond to principal components found in the 1998 analysis (see Nicoletti et al, 1999).
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Table 23. Barriers to trade and investment: country scores by domain and sub-domain1 
  Domain   Sub-Domain 
  
Barriers to trade and 
investment   
Explicit barriers to 
trade and 
investment 
 Other barriers 
  1998 2003   1998 2003   1998 2003 
Australia 1.0 0.9   1.6 1.4  0.3 0.2 
Austria 1.3 0.7   2.0 1.0  0.4 0.2 
Belgium 1.1 0.3   1.4 0.5  0.8 0.1 
Canada 1.3 1.1   2.0 1.7  0.5 0.4 
Czech Republic 3.1 0.9   3.2 1.4  3.1 0.3 
Denmark 0.9 0.8   1.3 1.0  0.4 0.7 
Finland 1.1 0.6   1.3 1.0  0.7 0.2 
France 1.5 1.0   2.3 1.5  0.5 0.3 
Germany 0.9 0.6   1.0 0.6  0.8 0.7 
Greece 1.9 1.2   2.5 1.4  1.2 1.0 
Hungary 1.9 1.4   2.9 2.1  0.7 0.6 
Iceland 1.0 0.3   1.2 0.5  0.6 0.1 
Ireland 0.8 0.5   1.2 0.8  0.3 0.2 
Italy 1.5 1.1   2.2 1.7  0.5 0.4 
Japan 1.3 0.9   2.0 1.4  0.5 0.3 
Korea 2.2 1.3   2.4 1.9  2.1 0.4 
Luxembourg 
- 0.7   - 1.1  - 0.2 
Mexico 2.1 2.4   2.9 3.4  1.0 1.0 
Netherlands 0.9 0.7   1.3 1.0  0.4 0.3 
New Zealand 1.6 0.8   2.3 1.3  0.7 0.2 
Norway 1.0 0.8   1.2 0.9  0.7 0.6 
Poland 4.3 2.4   4.3 3.0  4.4 1.7 
Portugal 1.1 0.8   1.6 1.2  0.5 0.3 
Slovak Republic 
- 1.6   - 1.6  - 1.5 
Spain 1.6 0.7   1.5 0.7  1.7 0.6 
Sweden 1.4 0.8   2.0 1.2  0.7 0.3 
Switzerland 1.7 1.0   1.5 1.5  2.0 0.4 
Turkey 2.3 1.7   3.4 2.5  1.0 0.6 
United Kingdom 0.6 0.4   0.8 0.5  0.3 0.2 
United States 1.1 0.7   1.7 1.1   0.3 0.2 
1 Sub-domains correspond to principal components found in the 1998 analysis (see Nicoletti et al, 1999). 
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Table 24. Overall PMR indicator. administrative and economic regulation1  
  
Product market 
regulation   
Administrative 
regulation   Economic regulation 
  1998 2003   1998 2003   1998 2003 
Australia 1.3 0.9   1.2 1.0   1.6 0.9 
Austria 1.8 1.4   1.8 1.9   2.3 1.5 
Belgium 2.1 1.4   2.1 1.9   2.6 1.8 
Canada 1.4 1.2   1.1 0.8   1.5 1.4 
Czech Republic 3.0 1.7   2.4 2.4   3.1 2.0 
Denmark 1.5 1.1   1.1 1.1   2.1 1.4 
Finland 2.1 1.3   2.5 1.3   2.5 1.9 
France 2.5 1.7   3.2 1.6   2.8 2.3 
Germany 1.9 1.4   2.5 1.9   2.2 1.8 
Greece 2.8 1.8   2.5 1.9   3.4 2.2 
Hungary 2.5 2.0   1.6 1.5   3.4 2.7 
Iceland 1.6 1.0   2.1 1.8   1.8 1.1 
Ireland 1.5 1.1   1.4 1.1   1.9 1.5 
Italy 2.8 1.9   3.1 1.6   3.7 2.6 
Japan 1.9 1.3   2.8 1.7   1.8 1.4 
Korea 2.5 1.5   2.8 1.8   2.4 1.6 
Luxembourg 
- 1.3   - 1.6   - 1.5 
Mexico 2.4 2.2   3.0 2.0   2.2 2.1 
Netherlands 1.8 1.4   2.0 1.9   2.4 1.6 
New Zealand 1.4 1.1   1.5 1.4   1.1 1.1 
Norway 1.8 1.5   1.6 1.0   2.7 2.3 
Poland 3.9 2.8   3.1 2.9   3.7 2.7 
Portugal 2.1 1.6   2.0 1.5   3.0 2.2 
Slovak Republic 
- 1.4   - 1.5   - 1.1 
Spain 2.3 1.6   2.8 2.0   2.5 2.1 
Sweden 1.8 1.2   2.0 1.1   2.0 1.7 
Switzerland 2.2 1.7   2.6 2.2   2.5 2.0 
Turkey 3.1 2.3   3.2 3.0   3.6 2.1 
United Kingdom 1.1 0.9   1.2 0.8   1.5 1.4 
United States 1.3 1.0   1.4 1.1   1.4 1.3 
1 Sub-domains correspond to principal components found in the 1998 analysis (see Nicoletti et al, 1999). 
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